

# A Public Key Cryptosystem Based on Actions by Semigroups

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## I. INTRODUCTION

A generalization of the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange in  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$  found a new depth when Miller [4] and Koblitz [2] suggested that such a protocol could be used with the group over an elliptic curve. In the present article, we extend such a generalization to the setting of a semigroup action (G-action) on a finite set. We define this extended protocol, show how it is related to the general Diffie-Hellman key exchange and give some examples. The interesting thing is that every action by an abelian semigroup gives rise to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. With an additional assumption it is also possible to extend the ElGamal protocol. In the next section we explain this in detail.

## II. DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL IN THE CONTEXT OF GROUP ACTIONS

Consider a semigroup  $G$ , i.e. a set that comes with an associative multiplication ‘ $\cdot$ ’. In particular we do not require that  $G$  has either an identity element or that each element has an inverse. We say that the semigroup is abelian if the multiplication  $\cdot$  is commutative.

Let  $S$  be a finite set and consider an action of  $G$  on  $S$ :

$$\begin{aligned} G \times S &\longrightarrow S \\ (g, s) &\longmapsto gs. \end{aligned}$$

By the definition of a group action we require that  $(g \cdot h)s = g(hs)$  for all  $g, h \in G$  and  $s \in S$ .

If the semigroup  $G$  is abelian then every  $G$ -action gives rise to a generalized Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange:

**Protocol 1 (Extended Diffie-Hellman key exchange)** Let  $S$  be a finite set and  $G$  an abelian semigroup acting on  $S$ . The Extended Diffie-Hellman key exchange is the following protocol:

1. Alice and Bob agree on an element  $s \in S$ .
2. Alice chooses  $a \in G$  and computes  $as$ . Alice’s private key is  $a$ , her public key is  $as$ .
3. Bob chooses  $b \in G$  and computes  $bs$ . Bob’s private key is  $b$ , his public key is  $bs$ .
4. Their common secret key is then  $a(bs) = (a \cdot b)s = (b \cdot a)s = b(as)$ .

As in the situation of exponentiation in cyclic groups, it is possible to construct an ElGamal one-way trapdoor function which is based on semigroup actions if one assumes that the set  $S$  has a group structure. See [3] for details.

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## III. A MATRIX ACTION ON ABELIAN GROUPS

In this example consider an abelian group  $H$ . The group  $H$  is a  $\mathbb{Z}$  module and  $(Mat_{n \times n}(\mathbb{Z}), \cdot)$  acts on  $S := H^n = H \times \dots \times H$  via the formal multiplication:

$$(A \cdot g)_i = \prod_{j=1}^n g_j^{a_{ij}}, \text{ with } (A)_{ij} = a_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}.$$

The semigroup operation in  $Mat_{n \times n}(R)$  is not commutative, but we can easily define a commutative sub-semigroup as follows:

Fix a matrix  $A \in Mat_{n \times n}(\mathbb{Z})$  and define

$$G := R[A] := \{p(A) \mid p(t) \in R[t]\}.$$

With respect to matrix multiplication  $G$  has the structure of an abelian semigroup. The protocol then simply requires that Alice and Bob agree on a vector  $s \in H^n$ . Then Alice chooses a matrix  $X \in Z[A]$  and sends to Bob the vector  $Xs$ , an element of the module  $H^n$ . Bob chooses a matrix  $Y \in Z[A]$  and sends to Alice the vector  $Ys$ . The common key is then the vector  $XYs$  which both can compute since  $X$  and  $Y$  commute.

## IV. AN ACTION FROM THE ENDOMORPHISM RING OF AN ABELIAN GROUP

Let  $H$  be an abelian group, and  $\text{End } H$  the ring of endomorphisms of  $H$ . Consider the natural action of  $\text{End } H$  on  $H$ . For a given  $\varphi \in \text{End } H$ , the subring  $\mathbb{Z}[\varphi]$  is commutative and yields to a Diffie-Hellman protocol. Note that in the case of a cyclic group or when  $\varphi = Id_H$ , we are dealing with the traditional Diffie-Hellman protocol. A concrete example is the case of an elliptic curve  $E$  over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ . If this curve is ordinary with complex multiplication, then the action of the Frobenius endomorphism  $\varphi$  on  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$  gives rise to a new situation that extends the usual DLP over such a group [1]. Details about this group action will be provided in [3].

## REFERENCES

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